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How pathways differ from mechanisms and why it matters
Lauren N. Ross
In the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as
mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently
use the term “mechanism” in their explanations of biological phenomena. While scientists appeal
to a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, many philosophers argue or assume that all
of these concepts are well understood with the single notion of mechanism (Robins and Craver
2009; Craver 2007). This reveals a significant problem with mainstream mechanistic accounts–
although philosophers use the term “mechanism” interchangeably with other causal concepts, this
is not something that scientists always do. This paper analyses two causal concepts in biology–the
notions of “mechanism” and “pathway”–and how they figure in biological explanation. I argue
that these concepts have unique features, that they are associated with distinct strategies of causal
investigation, and that they figure in importantly different types of explanation.
1 Introduction. For nearly two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as
much attention as mechanistic explanation. The beginnings of this “new mechanist” philosophy
are often associated with a paper by Machamer et al. (2000), which outlines the general view and
remains one of the most cited publications in Philosophy of Science. While various accounts of
mechanistic explanation exist,1 many of them describe mechanisms as organized sets of entities
and activities that underlie and produce some phenomenon of interest. This explanatory pattern
involves explaining some outcome by appealing to the mechanism that produces it. While this ba-
sic picture is thought to well-represent explanation in many domains, it has been most extensively
examined and applied to the biological sciences where it has led to a research program that has
quite literally “exploded” (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, xlviii). Not only does this explanatory
framework receive significant attention in the philosophical literature, but many view it as funda-
mental to any understanding of explanation in biology and as the “dominant view of explanation
in the philosophy of science at present” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 606).
One motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term “mechanism” in
their explanations of biological phenomena (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 2), (Bechtel
and Richardson 2010, xvii) (Wimsatt 1976, 671). Biologists, of course, use a variety of causal
concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes.
Despite this variety, mainstream philosophical views interpret all of these concepts with the notion
of mechanism. For example, Robins and Craver (2009) state that although scientists appeal to
terms like “cascades, pathways, systems, and substrates...[w]e use the term mechanism for all of
these” (Robins and Craver 2009, 42). Similarly, Craver claims that while scientists “say that they
discover “systems and pathways in the flow of information, and molecular cascades, mediators,
and modulators...[t]he term mechanism could do the same work” (Craver 2007, 3). These claims
1For some of these accounts, see (Glennan 1996; Craver 2007; Bechtel and Richardson 2010). For an excellent
overview of different philosophical projects connected with the “mechanism” concept, see (Andersen 2014a;
Andersen 2014b).
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receive widespread support in the philosophical literature. This is evidenced by the fact that
numerous philosophical projects analyze the appeal to various causal concepts (e.g. pathways,
cascades, processes, etc.) as instances of mechanistic explanation.2 Further evidence of this is
seen in discussions of non-mechanistic explanation, where the goal is to find explanations that are
non-causal as it is often assumed that all causal explanations (and those causal concepts figuring
in them) are mechanistic (Kaplan and Craver 2011).
This mechanistic approach faces a significant problem. Although philosophers use the notion
of a mechanism interchangeably with other causal concepts, this is not something that scientists
always do. Consider the notion of a pathway, which commonly figures in biological explanation.
Examples of this concept include gene expression pathways, cell signaling pathways, metabolic
pathways, anatomical pathways, developmental pathways, and ecological pathways. Scientists often
distinguish pathways from mechanisms. They claim that a single pathway can be instantiated by
different mechanisms, that distinct pathways can have similar mechanisms, and that pathways can
be discovered without any knowledge of the mechanisms that underlie them. When introducing
scientific material they often claim to discuss both the mechanisms and pathways relevant to some
topic and they appear to consistently use each concept in some situations, while not in others.
These points raise a number of puzzles for the dominant mechanistic program. If all or most of
the causal concepts in biology are well interpreted with the notion of mechanism, why do scientists
often distinguish mechanisms from these other concepts? Why do they use a variety of causal terms
if the single notion of mechanism would suffice? Finally, what explains their seemingly consistent
use of particular causal concepts in some situations, while not in others? These puzzles suggest
that it is worth exploring how scientists distinguish various causal concepts in biology and how
these distinctions matter for understanding causal explanation in this domain.
This paper examines how the mechanism and pathway concepts are used in the biology and
how they figure in biological explanation. I argue that these concepts: (a) have unique features,
(b) that they are associated with distinct strategies of causal investigation, and (c) that they figure
in importantly different types of explanation.3 One important caveat of this project is that I argue
for these claims in the context of the biological sciences, which I take to include neuroscience and
medicine. I do not extend these claims to other fields such as the causal modeling literature (in
general), economics, or political science, where the mechanism concept is often used in a more
flexible way.4 Furthermore, even in the context of the biological sciences I am not going to claim
that scientists always, in every case, use these concepts in the ways I indicate. Surely at least
one scientist uses one of these concepts in a different manner. Surely at least one counterexample
exists. What I am claiming is that scientists often use these concepts in the ways I discuss and
that it makes sense that they do. In relation to this, a main theme throughout my analysis is
2For example, the philosophical account of mechanism is used to analyze biological phenomena including
metabolic pathways (Bechtel 2011; Bogen and Machamer 2010; Bechtel and Levy 2013; Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen 2005; Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Thagard 2003), developmental pathways (Fagan 2013; Tabery
2014), gene-expression pathways (Bickle 2006), and signaling cascades (Brigandt 2013).
3My interest in this project has been importantly influenced by conversations with Ken Schaffner and his
discussions of the pathway concept, which he suggests is unlikely to be well-accommodated by the new
mechanist paradigm (Schaffner 2016). My analysis explores this suggestion by providing a novel character-
ization of the “pathway” concept, how it differs from the notion of “mechanism,” and how these differences
matter for causal investigation and explanation in biology.
4I should also exclude from my focus highly mathematical areas of biology where the “pathway” concept is
not always causal, but sometimes captures correlations (as is the case for particular network models).
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that when scientists refer to biological systems as “mechanisms” and “pathways” they often do so
because these systems share features with structures in ordinary life that we associate with these
concepts. In this sense, scientists are analogizing these systems to structures in ordinary life that
we are familiar with. This is a strategy for making complicated features of complex biological
systems more cognitively accessible. While the presence of such analogies in scientific discourse
and reasoning is not a new observation, its relevance to the mechanism concept (and other causal
concepts in biology) has been surprisingly unexplored.5 I explore this suggestion and argue for the
aforementioned claims (a, b, c) in the rest of this paper, which is structured as follows. In section 2,
I briefly discuss the mechanism concept, its features, the strategies of causal investigation that it is
associated with, and how it figures in biological explanation. Section three introduces the pathway
concept, its main features, and a common causal investigative strategy that it is associated with.
This section compares the pathway concept to the mechanism concept, in order to clarify how they
differ. In section 4, I explore (three examples of) one type of pathway explanation, where pathway
information is explanatory and mechanistic information is not. The final section returns to the
topic of analogy in scientific reasoning and contains some concluding remarks.
2 Mechanisms: The basics. Biologists frequently appeal to mechanisms in their explanations
and descriptions of biological phenomena. They discuss the mechanisms of gene regulation, DNA
synthesis, nerve firing, muscle contraction, visual processing, and so on. When they use the mech-
anism concept they often suggest that some biological phenomenon can be understood as a kind
of machine or mechanical system–such as a car engine or clock–in the sense of having particular
features. This machine analogy encourages thinking of biological phenomena as having component
parts, which are spatially organized, and that causally interact to produce some behavior of the
system. A key feature of this explanatory pattern (which I discuss in more detail later) is that it
involves explaining some outcome by appealing to its causal parts. The system-level behavior serves
as the effect or explanatory target (i.e. explanandum), while the interacting mechanical parts are
what explain this behavior (i.e. explanans).
Three features of this mechanism concept should be highlighted. First, mechanisms are often
characterized as having a constitutive makeup, in the sense of involving particular systems with
higher level behaviors that can be decomposed into lower-level causal parts. This feature is exploited
in efforts to discover mechanisms through common investigative strategies of “decomposition and
localization,” which are considered the “central heuristics” of mechanism discovery (Wimsatt 1974;
Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Bechtel and Levy 2013). This strategy involves a process where
scientists identify a system or behavior of interest and then “drill down” to identify the system’s
parts, their location, and how they interact to produce the behavior in question. This can be
understood as starting with an effect and searching “backward” or causally upstream to identify the
causal mechanism that produces it. Scientists also approach discovery from the opposite direction.
They can start their inquiry with the causal components of a mechanism and search “forward” or
causally downstream to identify its effects. In other words, the former involves starting with an
effect and looking backward to search for its causes, while the latter involves starting with causes
and looking forward to identify their effects. In both cases a set of factors are circumscribed as
the causal parts that makeup the mechanism where these factors are determined on the basis of
their causal relevance to the system and, in particular, their causal relevance to some effect of
5For discussion of analogy and analogical reasoning in science, see: (Hempel 1965, 434), (Hesse 1966), (Lewis
1986, 220), (Nersessian 2002).
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interest. This contributes to our conception of mechanisms as discrete singular causal entities in
the same way that we talk about particular car engines or clock mechanisms as single, distinct
causal systems (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, 35). These causal systems have boundaries and they
can be discussed as individual units that need not be connected to other causal systems in the
world (Andersen 2014a, 276).
A second feature of the mechanism concept is that it is used to refer to causal systems that
are described in significant amounts of causal detail as opposed to abstracting from such informa-
tion. Consider the “mechanism of enzyme catalysis” where an enzyme catalyses (or speeds up)
the chemical conversion of an upstream substrate into a downstream product. Scientists refer to
these enzymes as “molecular machines,” because they perform these conversions in multi-subunit
complexes, which are understood as having many causally interacting parts (Spirin 2002, 153).
These parts and their interactions are represented in “reaction mechanism” diagrams, which in-
clude components such as the enzyme itself, its substrate, and various cofactors and regulators that
alter its functionality. Scientists expect complete descriptions of these mechanisms to contain large
amounts of causal information. Consider the following quote:
“An understanding of the complete mechanism of action of a purified enzyme requires
identification of all substrates, cofactors, products, and regulators. Moreover, it re-
quires a knowledge of (1) the temporal sequence in which enzyme-bound reaction in-
termediates form, (2) the structure of each intermediate and each transition state, (3)
the rates of interconversion between intermediates, (4) the structural relationship of
the enzymes to each intermediate, and (5) the energy contributed by all reacting and
interacting groups to intermediate complexes and transition states. As yet, there is
probably no enzyme for which we have an understanding that meets all these require-
ments” (Lehninger and Cox 2008, 205, emphasis added).
As this quote suggests, scientists expect descriptions of these mechanisms to contain a large degree
of causal information–so much information, in fact, that it has not been acquired it in our best
scientific understanding of these systems. This same sentiment is present in scientists’s discussion
of the “mechanism of action” for particular drugs. They claim that these mechanisms must involve
“a complete and detailed understanding of each and every step in the sequence of events that
leads to..[an]...outcome,” “a comprehensive understanding of the entire sequence of events,” and
“detailed knowledge of the causal and temporal relationships among all the steps leading to a
specific effect” (Hutchinson 2007, 1,7) (Ankley 2010, 731). This mechanistic understanding is
contrasted with other approaches, which only capture “selected key events” and have “gaps and
black boxes in which mechanistic details are either unknown or not needed” (Hutchinson 2007,
1) (Ankley 2010, 732).6 The expectation that mechanisms contain significant causal detail is
expressed by many philosophical accounts of mechanism (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000;
Darden 2006; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013). This feature of mechanisms is associated
with our interest in understanding how they work and our assumption that this often involves
identifying more and more information about their causal components, organization, and so on.
Furthermore, acquiring such information is useful for various reasons–it suggests different potential
targets to use in changing a final outcome, it provides more information on how a mechanism might
6(Ankley, Bennett, Erickson, Hoff, Hornung, Johnson, Mount, Nichols, Russom, Schmieder, Serrrano, Tietge,
and Villeneuve 2010, 731)
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break, and it can lead to the identification of causal relationships that are more invariant or stable
across different contexts. Additionally, the characterization of mechanisms as single, individual
causal systems with boundaries, makes the expectation of significant detail more natural, than it
would be if they were understood as having various causal connections to other systems in the
world.
A third feature of the mechanism concept is that it often involves an emphasis on the “force,”
“action,” and “motion” involved in causal relationships. This emphasis is evident in how we discuss
machines in ordinary life–machines have parts, such as pulleys, levers, hammers, and gears, which
actively do things. We do not simply say that these parts “cause” various outcomes in each system,
we say that they “push,” “pull,” “bend,” and “compress” some downstream component. Mechanism
descriptions in biology involve a similar emphasis–scientists say that a cofactor “activates” an
enzyme, which then “binds” to a substrate, before “splicing” off a chemical moiety, and “attaching”
it to another molecule. The fact that the mechanism concept has this feature is should be somewhat
unsurprising, because the term “mechanism” literally draws on mechanics or the branch of science
and mathematics concerned with “motion and the forces producing motion” (OUP 2012, 449).
What is the significance of this feature? Emphasizing the force or action of causal relationships
serves a few functions in biological (and other) contexts. First, it helps to satisfy our interest in
understanding “how” a mechanism works–adding force or motion terms adds something more than
just saying that X causes Y. Second, these terms also function to fill in space between cause and
effect variables, which can suggest closer physical proximity and satisfy our interest in getting more
detail about the mechanism of interest. Causal terms involving force and motion appear to fill in
black boxes and suggest that we know more about some causal process than merely saying “that”
X causes Y.
Thus, in the biological sciences “mechanism” is often used to refer to causal systems that have
a constitutive character, that are represented in significant, fine-grained detail, and that contain
an emphasis on the “force,” “action”, or “motion” of causal relations. This concept is associated
with the causal investigative strategies of decomposition and localization and it is involved in an
explanatory pattern where some outcome is explained by appealing to the causal mechanism that
produces it.
3 The pathway concept. The pathway concept is commonly found in the biological sci-
ences. Biologists refer to gene expression pathways, metabolic pathways, developmental pathways,
anatomical pathways, and ecological pathways, just to name a few. In all of these cases the no-
tion of a pathway refers to a sequence of causal steps that string together an upstream cause to a
set of causal intermediates to some downstream outcome. For example, gene expression pathways
track causal connections from genes, to their downstream products, to a final phenotype (Figure
1). Metabolic pathways capture a sequence of steps in the conversion of some initial metabolic
substrate into a final downstream product (Figure 2). Developmental pathways depict a step-wise
set of changes in the development of some early precursor system (e.g. cell, tissue, or organism)
into a later final state (Figure 3). Anatomic pathways capture physical routes, which outline causal
paths such as lymphatic pathways, blood vessels, and nerve tracts (Figure 4). Finally, ecologi-
cal pathways track causal links of predator-prey relationships where these are represented in food
chains that make up larger food webs (Figure 5 (Smith and Smith 2012, 325)).
When biologists use the pathway concept they often imply that some system can be understood
in terms of causal routes or roadways, which capture interconnected paths that track the flow or
5
movement of some entity through a system. In these cases they analogize a biological system to
our ordinary life conception of roadways, highways, and city streets. However, what exactly are
the features of this pathway concept? How is it used in causal investigation and explanation in
biology? Finally, how does it differ from the mechanism concept, if it does at all?
Figure 1: Cell-signaling pathway: An abstract model.
3.1 Main features. The pathway concept, as it is commonly used in biology, has at least
four main features: it captures a (i) sequence of steps, where these steps (ii) track the flow of
some entity through a system, (iii) abstract from significant causal detail, and (iv) emphasize the
“connection” aspect of causal relationships. A (i) first feature of the pathway concept, which the
above cases make clear, is that it captures a sequence of causal steps in some process. This sequence
captures a fixed order of causal relationships that reflects which outcomes need to occur before and
after others in the unfolding of a causal process. For example, consider the first three steps of
the glycolytic pathway, which represents the biochemical conversion of glucose into pyruvate (fig
2). In these steps, glucose is first converted into glucose-6-phosphate (G6P), which is converted
into fructose-6-phosphate (F6P), which is converted into fructose-1,6,-bisphosphate (F-1,6-BP).
The glycolytic pathway captures the sense in which these steps need to take place in a particular
order–glucose cannot be directly converted into F-1,6-BP without first forming the G6P and F6P
intermediates, and it must go through both intermediates without omitting one or reversing their
order. Furthermore, the pathway does not just capture a fixed order of entities, but a fixed order
of causally related entities. The glycolytic pathway captures a causal chain in the sense that every
downstream product depends on an upstream substrate. In other words, the upstream substrate
is at least one causally relevant factor in the production of the most immediately downstream
product. Other cases of the pathway concept in biology involve this same fixed sequence of causal
relations, but differ in terms of the causal relata along the pathway. Biologists sometimes refer to
these causal chains as this as “domino causality,” because like a sequence of falling dominos, the
effect at one step becomes a cause of the next (Grotzer and Basca 2003). While these cases depict
pathways as linear sequences, they can also have branching and circular arrangements (and they
can be nested in complex causal networks or interconnected sets of pathways).
It might seem that this first feature does not capture a true difference between the pathway and
mechanism concepts, because both can be understood in terms of sequential causal steps. There
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Figure 2: Glycolysis: A metabolic pathway.
is more to say about the causal sequences captured by pathways that reveals how this concept
differs from the notion of mechanism. In particular, one difference, and a (ii) second key feature of
the pathway concept, is that it represents causal sequences that capture the “flow” of some entity
through a system. For example, metabolic pathways trace the flow of chemical substances through
stepwise changes, stem cell pathways capture the flow of cells through developmental sequences,
anatomical pathways such as blood vessels trace the flow of blood through the body, and ecological
pathways trace the flow of energy through ecosystems. This notion of “flow” refers to something
that is carried over from one causal step to the next–it involves the permanence or continuity
of something that moves or travels along causal connections.7 Use of the “pathway” concept in
these cases is not just a happy coincidence–scientists use the pathway concept to refer to these
biological systems, because they have features that are similar to pathways we discuss in everyday
life. One of these shared features is the notion of “flow.” This notion is common to ordinary
life examples of pathways, such as how cars move along freeways and how water courses along
pipes in a plumbing system. The fact that scientists explicitly point out this similarity is seen
in the language they use to describe these system. They refer to the “flux” of chemicals along
“metabolic roads and byways” (Lehninger and Cox 2008, 528), (Pardee 1994, 375), they claim
7To be clear, I am not suggesting that the pathway concept supports connected process or mark transmission
accounts of causation. Instead, pathways represent causal relationships that have the additional feature
of capturing the flow of some entity, while not all causal relationships have this feature (as is the case in
absence causation examples). Additionally, while these cases involve the flow or movement of some material
through a system, other pathway examples involve the flow of immaterial phenomena such as the flow of
information in cell-signaling pathways.
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Figure 3: Stem cell pathways.
that lymphatic pathways are “avenues” and “routes” along which “lymph is transported” (Meyers,
Charnsangavej, and Oliphant 2005, 4), (Richter and Feyerabend 2004, 6), that food chains are
“energy channels that propagate matter and energy...linked by predators”’ (Moore and de Ruiter
2012, 225) and literally that ecological pathways are “plumbing of sorts–through which matter and
energy flow within ecosystems” (Caswell 2005, viii). The pathway concept and language of “flow”
are not simply meaningless, colorful metaphors–they are pointing out objective, physical features
of these systems that reveal how they operate in the world and how we can best study, discover,
and understand them. For example, flow through these systems is often experimentally studied
with tracer and tagging techniques that exploit the physical flow through them.8 Furthermore,
“blockages” in these pathways, as in the case of “inborn errors of metabolism,” can be understood
through analogical reasoning with ordinary life traffic-freeway examples.9 Instead of being a trivial
8These techniques tag material, which is sent into the pathway, so that pathway steps, flow rates, and
interconnections can be discovered.
9These blockages result in a pathologic build-up of material upstream of the blockage or accident. Suc-
cessful therapeutic measures involve rerouting this material along “bypass” routes, shunting it to some
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Figure 4: Anatomical (vascular) pathways: Blood vessels.
turn-of-phrase, the pathway concept is used to highlight features of these biological systems that
matter for how they are scientifically studied and for how they are used to control outcomes in the
world.
When mechanisms are discussed in biological contexts, there is not usually an emphasis on the
“flow” of some entity through the mechanism. Mechanisms contain parts that interact to produce a
final effect, but there is usually not an emphasis on the movement of something across or along these
parts. Consider an objection to this claim. One might suggest that “causal influence” flows through
mechanisms, where this refers to the propagation of causal force through a set of a intermediates.
Of course, there is a sense in which all causal relationships involve the “flow” of causal influence, yet
something more is present in these pathway cases that is not found in all causal relationships, viz.
the movement of some further entity (e.g. metabolites, cells, blood, or energy rich substances),
besides causal influence. This is also supported by the fact that, in biological contexts where
“pathways” are identified, there are numerous causal relationships transmitting “causal influence,”
but only some of these relationships are highlighted and represented as pathways–viz. those that
trace the movement of some particular entity of interest.
non-pathologic product, reducing influx into the blocked pathway, and supplying the needed material down-
stream of the blockade.
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Figure 5: Ecological pathways: Food chains within a food web (Smith and Smith 2012, 325).
A third feature of the pathway concept–and one that clearly differs from the notion of a
mechanism–is that they represent causal sequences that abstract from significant amounts of causal
detail. One way that pathways abstract from detail is that they only represent causal factors that
capture the flow of some entity through system and not the entirely of factors that support or are
causally relevant to this flow. For example, metabolic pathways represent the flow of metabolites
and not the many other factors that can control or regulate this flow, such as enzymes, cofac-
tors, temperature, pH, etc. This is similar to how road maps represent freeways and city streets
without also depicting traffic lights, police officers, or road blocks, which can regulate or alter the
flow of traffic along these routes. These pathway diagrams abstract from this type of information.
A second way that pathways abstract from detail is by representing complex processes with an
economy of causal steps. This is easily seen in the case of developmental pathways, which capture
the development of living cells, tissues, and organisms in a limited number of stages. For exam-
ple, the entire life cycle of many organisms is represented in anywhere from 4 to 12 main steps
(Mahadeo and Parent 2006, 116), which could each be further divided into numerous causal links.
Biologists make explicit reference to this difference between the mechanism and pathway concepts.
While they emphasize the need for detail in mechanism cases, they explicitly state that pathways
are “not intended...to be exhaustive descriptions” (McClanahan and Branch 2008, 5). This is also
seen in the fact that they claim that “complete pathways” have been identified, while “complete
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mechanisms” are still beyond our reach. While scientists admit that no “complete” mechanism
of enzyme catalysis has yet to be uncovered due to the immense detail that this requires, they
claim that the “whole pathway” of glycolysis was discovered in the 1930s (Lehninger and Cox 2008,
528). This, and other discussions of the identification of “complete” pathways in ecology reveals
the lower standard of causal detail that they are expected to meet (Wentsel, Beyer, Forbes, Maund,
and Pastorok 2008, 217).
I am suggesting that one clear difference between these concepts is that pathways abstract
from significant causal detail, while mechanisms include it. Consider a few objections to this po-
sition. First, one might claim that significant causal detail is not a necessary or characteristic
feature of mechanisms and that some mechanisms do, in fact, abstract from such information.
While some mechanistic philosophers subscribe to this “abstract mechanism view,” most under-
stand mechanisms as highly detailed.10 Philosophers who promote this former view are likely to
claim that pathways are easily accommodated by philosophical accounts of mechanism, because
there is nothing problematic about the notion of an “abstract mechanism” and that this is exactly
what pathways are. One main problem with this response is that biologists simply do not use the
mechanism concept in this way–they consistently use “mechanism” to refer to causal structures
that contain significant amounts of detail and they rarely apply it to structures with sparse causal
information. These pathway cases and other examples of abstract causal relationships (such as
monocausal models of disease) are rarely if every referred to as mechanisms and they are consis-
tently viewed by scientists as devoid of mechanistic information. Furthermore, frequent use of the
“mechanism” concept in biology was one of the original motivations for constructing a mechanistic
account of explanation–to misinterpret the use of this term conflicts with one of the very motivations
for constructing such an account of explanation and it detracts from the potential strength it might
have. If we want a philosophical account of mechanism that is representative of how biologists use
this concept, it should accommodate the fact that they often use it in cases where they expect and
want significant, fine-grained causal detail. If not, we should admit that our philosophical analysis
is not representative of this scientific concept. Of course, we can formulate a philosophical account
of mechanism that is divorced from the scientific use of the this term, but, if we do this, we should
be upfront about it and refrain from claiming that biological terminology and reasoning support
this view. I do not think that we should do this, because it would obscure the reasons scientists
have for using these concepts and it would prevent us from accommodating the role of analogy in
these cases.
A second objection to my analysis retains the view that mechanisms involve significant detail
and simply claims that pathways are early-stage mechanism sketches or schemata, which have yet
to be filled in with sufficient detail (Craver 2007, 113-114) This is a standard interpretation of
these pathway examples in the literature (Craver and Darden 2013, 91). As these interpretations
suggest that increases in causal detail track increases in explanatory power, it is claimed that the
lack of detail in pathways results in the explanatory deficiency of this causal concept. In fact, these
mechanistic accounts associate the pathway concept with the “vice of chainology” where “[o]ne
becomes fascinated by nodes in a causal chain but loses sight of how the nodes work to produce,
underlie, or maintain the phenomenon” (Craver and Darden 2013, 91). These pathways are causal
structures that are “incomplete” and reflect a “shallowness” of understanding (Craver and Darden
2013, 91-92). This interpretation represents a misconception of the pathway concept in biology
10Proponents of the former position include (Bechtel and Levy 2013) and the latter (Machamer, Darden,
and Craver 2000; Darden 2006; Craver 2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011).
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and its role in explanation. This view seems to suggest that scientists aim to fill pathways in with
detail, but this conflicts with their explicit statement to the contrary–that such pathways are “not
intended...to be exhaustive descriptions” (McClanahan and Branch 2008, 5). Scientists consider
pathways to be “whole” and “complete” when they contain far less detail than “complete mecha-
nisms” (Lehninger and Cox 2008, 528) (Wentsel, Beyer, Forbes, Maund, and Pastorok 2008, 217).
These points suggest that pathways are not properly viewed as precursor, incomplete mechanism
sketches, but as a “complete,” albeit distinct, causal concept in their own right. Furthermore,
pathways are cited in explanations, without being viewed as explanatorily deficient–I explore this
further in section 4, where I consider the role of pathways in biological explanation.11
A fourth and final feature of the pathway concept is that it emphasizes the “connection” involved
in causal relationships as opposed to the “force,” “action,” and “motion,” which is emphasized in
the causal relationships in mechanisms. Where mechanisms involve specifying “how” X causes Y,
pathways involve simply capturing “that” X causes Y–in particular, the goal with the pathway
concept is to show, of some set of entities in a system, what is causally connected to what and not
the fine-grained details of “how” they are connected. This feature is alluded to when biologists refer
to ecological food webs as “connectance webs” and “wiring diagrams” that involve “showing which
species are connected to which” (Caswell 2005, vii,vii) This connection feature plays a significant
role in clarifying the causal investigative strategies that this concept is associated with and the role
in plays in explanation, which are topics I turn to now.
3.2 Investigative strategy. Recall that the mechanism concept is associated with the causal
investigative strategies of decomposition and localization. These strategies involve “drilling down”
or decomposing a system into its lower-level parts. Before this strategy can be implemented it
requires a first step that mechanists refer to as identifying a “locus of control,” which involves
specifying some (a) system and (b) effect of interest (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, 35). All causal
components of the mechanism are identified on the basis of these specifications–they are included
or omitted from the mechanism on the basis of whether they are found in (a) and whether they
causally contribute to (b). In this sense, mechanisms are circumscribed on the basis of which parts
causally interact to produce to the effect of interest. This effect-relative approach leads to the
identification of a single, discrete causal system–a set of causal parts that are responsible for the
effect and that are represented as distinct from other causal systems in the world.
The pathway concept is often associated with a different causal investigative strategy. A first
step in this pathway approach involves first identifying causal connections, or “pathways,” across
entities in some domain without specifying either an effect of interest or a causal starting point. In
this approach there is an interest in creating a map of available causal connections in some context–a
kind of roadmap, or what biologists might call a “network” or “landscape” of available causal routes.
Unlike the mechanism strategy these maps do not represent a particular, discrete set of causal parts
that all interact to produce a specific outcome. Instead they represent available (or potential) causal
11A third objection might claim that the “new mechanists” do view and account for pathways as a type of
mechanism: they classified them as “etiological” mechanisms in contrast to “constitutive” mechanisms.
Although this distinction is mentioned by some “new mechanists” the bulk of the literature on mechanistic
explanation has focused on the constitutive type. One reason for this is that discussions of etiological
processes in biology are not viewed by philosophers as paradigmatic mechanisms (and they are certain
not often referred to as mechanisms by biologists, but more often as “causal pathways,” as in the “causal
pathways” of disease etiology.
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connections that are relevant to a variety of explanatory outcomes and causal starting points. These
are channels that can be navigated to get from any one point in the map to any other. So instead
of identifying a particular explanatory target and “drilling down,” these maps involve identifying
a set of entities in some domain and “expanding out” by tracing their causal connections. These
connections are “available” (or potential) in a way that differs from the actual causal components
in mechanisms–they contain information about various causal possibilities as opposed to a single,
circumscribed causal process that leads to an effect. In other words, these causal maps are not
similar to car engines or watch mechanisms in the sense that they depict parts, which are all relative
to a single main behavior of some system. They are more like a set of available freeways that some
car or some entity of interest can travel along. Examples of these “pathway maps” are metabolic
pathways found in pathway databases12, stem cell pathway diagrams, anatomical illustrations of
vasculature, lymphatic vessels, and neural tracts, and ecological food webs (as shown in Figures
2-5). In all of these cases scientists are concerned with representing widespread causal connections
in some system without being tied to a single explanatory target. As these maps are intended to
reveal these widespread causal connections they are often referred to as “connectance” diagrams,
“wiring” maps, and connections that represent “global anatomic continuity” (Caswell 2005, vii)
(Meyers, Charnsangavej, and Oliphant 2005, viii). On first impression these diagrams clearly
seem to represent some type(s) of causal structure in the world. However, it might seem that
this structure does not clearly meet the mechanistic criteria–at the very least these diagrams do
not clearly identify detailed interacting parts of a system that produce single, particular behaviors.
Alternatively, they do seem to depict sets of interconnected routes. Once some set of interconnected
routes is captured, various explanatory questions can be asked and answered, which I turn to now.
4 Explanation: Pathways and mechanisms. Scientific explanations are often viewed as
answers to particular types of why-questions, in particular, “explanation-seeking” why-questions
(Hempel 1965). Within this framework, a why-question and its answer represent an explanandum
and its explanans, respectively. I am going to suggest that there are some explananda (phenomena)
for which pathway information is explanatory and mechanistic information is not. This identifies
one type of “pathway explanation” that differs from mechanistic explanation.
4.1 Pathway explanation: Three examples. I will illustrate one type of pathway explana-
tion with the pathway diagram shown in Figure 6. In this diagram, the letters and nodes represent
entities in some domain, while the arrows represent the causal relationships they participate in.
As I will soon clarify with some examples, this diagram contains pathway information in the sense
of containing information about causal relationships in some area, where these relationships have
pathway features (i)-(iv) discussed in section 3.1. In particular, the letters and nodes in this dia-
gram represent entities, while the arrows reflect causal connections among them. Before I discuss
this diagram further, it may already appear as though it contains information that answers why-
questions that mechanistic information cannot answer. These include questions such as: How many
different downstream products can substrate A produce? How many different upstream substrates
can lead to the production of D? How many different ways are there to get from B to C? If the
uppermost route from A to C in the diagram is blocked, what downstream products will excess sub-
12Examples of these maps include: Reactome, Kyoto Encyclopedia of Genes and Genomes (KEGG),
WikiPathways, Nature Pathway Interaction Database (PID) and Pathway Commons.
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strate A produce? Providing answers to these questions is very natural within the interconnected
“roadmap” representation of “available” pathways. However, these answers require a representation
of widespread, available causal interconnections and a kind of flexibility of causal starting-point or
effect end-point, which conflicts with the mechanism concept. Mechanisms specify “actual” inter-
acting components that make up a single, individual causal systems, which are relative to a fixed
explanatory target (or causal starting point). These features of mechanisms prevent them from
from capturing the widespread causal connections, which provide answers to the aforementioned
questions. Of course, one might claim that these why-questions may not be of the “explanation-
seeking” variety that are relevant to scientific explanation. In order to address this response, and
further illustrate the nature of one type of pathway explanation, I use diagram 6 to consider three
cases–two from science and one from ordinary life.
Figure 6: Pathway map: Ecological, anatomical, or “city-street” pathways
In a first example, the letters and nodes in diagram 6 represent species in an ecosystem, while the
causal connections (i.e. arrows) between them represent prey-predator relationships. In particular,
consider an actual scientific case where A is a bivalve species (clam), B is a species of crustacean,
and C, D, and E are different species of fish (Stewart, Luoma, Schlekat, Doblin, and Hieb 2004).
The diagram represents relationships between these species where downstream predators consume
upstream prey and energy flows downstream, in the direction of the arrows. These species are
located in the San Francisco Bay, which contains selenium–an element that is toxic to these or-
ganisms in high levels. It has been identified that fish species C contains high levels of selenium,
while fish species D and E do not. Scientists want to know why this is the case–they want to know
what explains these differences.13 They explain this by citing the fact that fish species C is causally
connected to species A, which contains high levels of this toxin. Alternatively, species D and E do
not have high levels of selenium, because they are causally connected to primary producers with
low levels of this compound, viz. species B (crustaceans), and not to species A (clams). In this
manner, “exposures of top predators can be explained by food web relationships” (Stewart, Luoma,
Schlekat, Doblin, and Hieb 2004, 4519). More specifically, they claim that the differences specified
13In particular, they explicitly ask: “Why did concentrations of Se differ so widely among predators in the
Bay, and do those differences still occur? Does food web biomagnification of Se occur, and if so, why is
it reflected differently in different predator species?” (Stewart, Luoma, Schlekat, Doblin, and Hieb 2004,
4519)
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by this why-question are “explained by food-related variables” (such as those shown in Figure 6),
background knowledge about how this toxin bioaccumulates along prey-predator connections, and
the fact that of those species under consideration “predators feed differently” (Stewart, Luoma,
Schlekat, Doblin, and Hieb 2004).14 The differences in how predators feed is captured in the path-
way information displayed in Figure 6. This pathway information is explanatorily relevant to the
explanandum in this case, because it is information that “makes a difference” to it. If fish species
C were no longer causally connected to A (or any primary producer with high selenium) it would
no longer have high levels of this compound, and if D and E were connected to A, they would.
These differences are not captured at the level of mechanistic information–the same pathways can
be instantiated by similar or different mechanistic details and differences in these details do not
track with changes in the explanatory target. In other words, so long as there are causal connec-
tions in the ecosystem represented by Figure 6, it does not matter “how” energy and selenium
move along these pathways, how they are metabolized by organisms, or further details about how
predators consume their prey–it just matters “that” these materials move through the ecosystem
in the particular way captured by the causal pathways in this diagram. In other words, varying
these lower-level mechanisms is not explanatorily relevant to the explanandum because changes in
these details do not “make a difference to” or change the outcome, while varying the pathways in
the diagram, would. I will explore these points further by analyzing two similar examples.
In a second case, the variables and nodes in Figure 6 represent spatial locations along lymphatic
pathways in a human patient where these pathways trace the physical location and movement of
lymphatic fluid through these vessels. It is discovered that cancer is present in location C, but not
in the nearby locations D and E, and there is an interest in knowing why this is the case. Similar
to the previous example, this is explained by the fact that A is the primary site of cancer and that
this upstream site is causally connected to C, but not to D and E. The cancerous cells move along
lymphatic vessels from A to C, seeding the growth of new cancerous off-shoots along the way. There
is no cancer in D and E simply because there is no causal route that connects A to these sites. This
method of explaining disease spread by appealing to anatomical pathways is found in other medical
contexts with minor variations–both cancer and infectious material can spread along anatomical
pathways such as lymphatic vessels, blood vessels, nerve tracts, and physically connected tissues
(such as interconnecting spaces through the abdomen and thorax) (Meyers, Charnsangavej, and
Oliphant 2005, 24). Researchers refer to these anatomical pathways as a “scaffold” and “intercon-
necting space” that disease processes use to navigate through the body. Tracking or following these
pathways helps to identify (1) downstream locations of pathogenesis given an original upstream
site, (2) upstream locations of original disease if only downstream pathogenesis is known, and (3)
expected locations of recurrent disease (Meyers, Charnsangavej, and Oliphant 2005, 55). Answer-
ing these questions, and explaining the downstream location of disease requires a widespread view
of the interconnections in this space, which reveals “potential” routes that a disease entity might
travel.15 Consider how scientists discuss the pathway concept in the context of this “cognitive
framework”:
14Tracer experiments suggest that these organisms acquire selenium through their diet and that it bioaccu-
mulates (or builds up) along prey-predator connections–this compound is “propagated up the respective
food webs” as predators acquire it from the prey they consume (Stewart, Luoma, Schlekat, Doblin, and
Hieb 2004, 4519).
15Consider another example: Why does a clot in the carotid artery cause an infarct in brain vasculature
(stroke) as opposed to a heart attack or pulmonary embolism? The reason is because the carotid directly
irrigates the vasculature of the brain and not the heart and lungs. The clot gets logged in the small vessels
15
“Understanding the pathways of extension of intraabdominal disease requires concep-
tualization of the interrelationship of this network..as one interconnecting space. This
continuity provides avenues for the direct spread of disease...A disease process, regard-
less of its site of origin or cause (tumor, inflammation, etc.), upon gaining access to this
interconnected space, is provided an anatomic avenue for direct spread...This unifying
concept of direct spread underlies an understanding of the clinical appearance of ab-
dominal disease at a distance from its site of origin solely by direct spread. Knowledge
of the possible pathways of spread provides a rational system for a clearer understand-
ing of disease process...” (Meyers, Oliphant, Berne, and Feldberg 1987, 601).
Here the emphasis is on depicting “one interconnecting space” that reveals various potential path-
ways for disease spread. In particular, the different ways that some locations are connected relative
to others, figures in explanations of the variable spread and location of disease. This should clearly
seem different from the discrete, isolable nature of mechanisms that capture individual causal struc-
tures, as opposed to a space of interconnected and potential causal routes. It is differences in the
way that C is connected up in this space, relative to D and E, that explain why disease is present
in the former but not the latter locations. In particular, the fact that C is causally connected to
the primary site of disease, via identifiable anatomical pathways, and that D and E are not is what
explains disease occurrence in the former, but not latter locations.
Third, consider an ordinary life case that captures a similar explanation to the those present
in the above two examples. In this situation, the variables and nodes in Figure 6 represent cities
and the arrows represent roads that connect them up. Cities A and B have corn factories and this
corn is delivered to cities C, D, and E with vehicles that travel along the routes displayed in this
diagram. It is discovered that city C has a supply of corn that is contaminated, while cities D and
E do not. We want to explain why this is the case–why there is this difference in contaminated
and uncontaminated corn across cities. This explanation is provided by the fact that a toxin has
infiltrated the corn supply at factory A and that roadways connect the delivery of this supply to
city C, but not cities D or E. An explanation of this difference is not provided by mechanistic,
or lower-level causal information about this situation. In asking why city C has contaminated
corn and why cities D and E do not, notice how unsatisfying it is for someone to tell you the
intricate, fine-grained details of how the delivery vehicles were loaded, how they were off-loaded,
and even how their engines work. These details do not matter for the difference in question–it
does not matter whether this corn was delivered by vehicles that are electric, gas, diesel, front-
wheel drive, rear-wheel drive, all-wheel drive, or the particular manner in which they were loaded
and off-loaded with corn. The same roadways–with similar or different vehicles and loading and
off-loading practices–would still give rise to the same difference in corn supply. Part of what this
shows is that, changes in these mechanistic details do not “make a difference” to the explanandum
of interest. What does make a difference is the higher-level structure of interconnecting roadways
in this system and differences in how cities are connected up. If factory A was connected to C, D,
and E, all of these cities would have contaminated corn. If it was not connected to these cities, none
of them would have it. The pathway information that captures these higher-level causal features
are what explain the differences in corn supply.
Although a more detailed treatment of these pathway explanations is best left for the subject
of a separate paper, it will help to briefly mention a few features of these explanations. To be clear,
of the brain before it ever reaches the more downstream location of the heart and lungs.
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these cases do not involve an interest in explaining “how” some entity travels along a pathway
or “why” some pathways have the structure they have. Instead, there is an interest in explaining
the difference in some feature across downstream locations. This difference is explained by the
causal connections or pathways in some domain, because changes in these connections would create
changes in this explanatory outcome.16 The same cannot be said for the lower-level mechanistic
information that instantiates these pathways. In fact, so long as the pathway relations remain
fixed, lower level mechanistic information can vary without making a difference to the explanatory
target. In each of these cases, information about the higher-level causal connections in some system
explains particular outcomes that lower-level causal information cannot explain.
5 Conclusion: Mechanism and pathway as analogy. It is a fact about the world that
it contains different causal systems with different features. I have suggested that these different
features lead to distinct causal investigative strategies, explanatory why-questions, and possibilities
for how such systems are represented, described, and discussed. Furthermore, it is a descriptive fact
about biology that scientists in this domain use particular causal terms to refer to these distinct
systems, as I have suggested they do with the “mechanism” and “pathway” concepts. This practice
is coherent and it makes sense for various reasons–in particular, it makes sense in the context of
analogizing these systems to structures in ordinary life that we are familiar with.
Consider that analogy is “a kind of similarity in which the same system of relations holds in two
different examples” (Jee, Uttal, Gentner, Manduca, Shipley, Tikoff, Ormand, and Sageman 2010, 2).
In this manner, analogy is often characterized as involving a mapping of structural features from a
well-known base to a less well-known target (Gentner 1983, 157). This mapping can serve a number
of purposes. A first main purpose is that it functions to transfer knowledge about some well-known
domain to one that is unknown or poorly understood. In fact, analogy is considered one of the most
effective strategies for “convey[ing] an entire system of relations in a new, unfamiliar example” and,
because of this, it is often used and examined in educational settings or any situation where a new
topic is described to a novice (Jee, Uttal, Gentner, Manduca, Shipley, Tikoff, Ormand, and Sageman
2010, 3) (Gentner and Smith 2012, 131). It is easy to see this being done in the mechanism and
pathway cases–entry-level biology text books introduce these causal structures and their features
with “machine” and “roadway” analogies, respectively. A second function of analogy is that it is
used to highlight key features of a target system to more expert audiences who already have some
familiarity with it. In this case, the analogy emphasizes features of the system that are relevant for
the context of inquiry. This makes sense of the fact that we see explicit use of these analogies in
high-level research publications, which focus on key features of some system for a particular purpose.
For example, the “roadmap” analogy, and associated concepts of “routes,” “transportation,” and
“flux,” are used in metabolic research projects that focus on the rate of product formation and
flow of metabolic material through a biochemical process. Alternatively, if there were an interest
in capturing “how” an enzyme converted a particular substrate into some particular product, the
“mechanism” concept would more likely be used. In this latter case, “flow” is not the primary
feature of interest, but instead the local, interacting enzyme components that product a particular
outcome–this leads to the characterization of enzymes as “molecular machines,” with constitutive
16The explanatorily relevant information in these pathways cases is similar to the “connectionist” information
discussed by (Bechtel and Levy 2013) and the topological information discussed by (Huneman 2018),
although there are clear differences. Comparing these accounts to the present analysis is an interesting
topic for future work.
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interacting component parts. Finally, a third function of these similarities is that they figure in
analogical reasoning and problem solving in new contexts. One example of this are cases of “inborn
errors of metabolism,” which are metabolic diseases that are understood with a “freeway” analogy
that captures the pathological build-up of material (or “traffic” caused by a “roadblock”) and
those therapeutic measures that address it.17 In this case, knowledge about solving problems in
the context of freeway traffic is applicable to solving problems involving “traffic” on metabolic
pathways. In all of these cases, the analogy is a sort of “psychological aid,” which makes complex
and (potentially) foreign features of biological systems more cognitively accessible and supports
reasoning in a new domain by rendering the problem into a familiar context (Hesse 1966, 3).
It is not just that, as philosophers, we can choose to interpret these causal concepts as relying
on analogy–scientists explicitly use these analogies in their work. These analogies pick out similar
causal structures that arise in a variety of biological contexts. For example, I have demonstrated
how the pathway concept is used to refer to a particular causal structure (with features i, ii, iii, and
v) found in molecular biology, biochemistry, stem cell biology, developmental biology, biomedicine,
and ecology. Scientists’s use of similar analogies in different contexts is consistent with evidence
that experts classify systems by shared causal structure even when they arise in different scientific
situations (Rottman, Gentner, and Goldwater 2012). Being able to do this–and to have an “abstract
understanding of causality” or ability to identify these “causal system categories,” as empirical
psychologists say–has advantages in the sense that these systems have similar implications for
prediction, explanation, and control.
What consequences does this analysis have for philosophical accounts of biological explana-
tion? My analysis indicates that biologists use a variety of causal terms to refer to unique causal
structures in their field. Moreover, these unique structures motivate distinct causal investigative
strategies, varying explanatory why-questions, and different explanatory patterns. We should want
a philosophical account of explanation that accommodates this diversity–the diversity of causal
structures in the world and our diverse techniques, methods, and strategies for managing them.
We should expect a philosophical account of explanation to tell us why some causal details are
explanatory and others are not, why some causal concepts are used in some situations, but not
in others, and why scientists use a variety of causal concepts, as opposed to always using the no-
tion of “mechanism.” My analysis outlines an approach for doing this. As causal explanation is
frequently understood as involving the explanation of some outcome by citing its causes, in some
sense it should be unsurprising that different complex causal structures are likely to lead to different
explanatory patterns. Standard accounts of mechanistic explanation can be compatible with this
picture, but they should capture a biologically accurate conception of mechanism and leave room
for the explanatory role of other causal concepts and structures. As many mechanistic philosophers
suggest, it makes sense to understand mechanisms in biology as causal structures that involve con-
stitutive relations, significant fine-grained detail, and causal-mechanical interactions expressed in
terms of “force,” “action,” and “motion.” This concept is well-representative of the majority of in-
17In these cases there is a blockage or “roadblock” along the metabolic pathways (induced by a gene muta-
tion), which leads to upstream “traffic” and the “build-up” of some prior substance and the absence of the
required downstream entity. This incessant build-up and the inability to produce downstream material can
result in severe pathology, which is avoided by therapies that re-route this traffic around the blockage (via
a bypass), shunt it into some non-pathologic downstream product, prevent flow into the blocked pathway,
or find some alternative way to produce the final products downstream of the blockage. Examples of these
diseases include phenylketouria, alcaptonuria, and glycogen storage disease.
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stances where biologists refer to “mechanisms.” However, if we accept this scientifically motivated
picture of mechanism, we cannot also maintain–as some suggest–that “mechanism” also captures
all other causal concepts in biology or that it is representative of all causal explanation in this
domain, because clearly there are causal structures in this area with different features. This line
would clearly undercut an honest depiction of the complexity of causal structures in biology and
the nuanced and complex reasoning practices, investigative strategies, and explanatory patterns
that they generate.
There may be a ready reply to these claims. Perhaps “mechanism” should be understood
as a “catch-all” or “one-size-fits-all” concept, which is intended to distinguish any generic causal
structure from those that are non-causal. Consider further, that there may be different “types”
of mechanisms within this broad category–perhaps the “mechanism” examples I have discussed
fall under some “mechanisma” category, while the “pathway” cases fall under some “mechanismb”
category. This might be used to indicate how a mechanistic account could be flexible enough to
capture all interesting causal structures and types of causal explanation in science. This approach
faces serious problems. First, if “mechanism” is synonymous with any causal structure, how is
mechanistic explanation different the generic claim that causes (or set of causes) explain their
effects? Surely no account of causal explanation would deny this. Relatedly, if “mechanism” is short
for “any causal structure” why not just say this? Mechanistic accounts have been motivated by the
view that “mechanism” is some type of important or unique causal structure, but this approach
distances the account from this motivation. Relatedly, these accounts are typically motivated by
our view that mechanisms have unique features, which are not found in all causal structures. We
see this in the fact that we refrain from calling single causes and causal chains “mechanisms.”
This leads to a second issue, which is that this “catch-all” approach simply does not accommodate
how “mechanism” is used in biology. If the new mechanists want to base an account of biological
explanation on a definition of “mechanism” that is divorced from biological use, they should have
a good reason for doing so and they should stop referring to the biological use of this term to
motivating interest in and suggest the credibility of their accounts. A third disadvantage of this
approach, is that, by glossing over the use of the “mechanism” and “pathway” concepts in biology,
we loose sight of a key strategy used in causal and explanatory reasoning–the use of analogy. By
appreciating the role of this strategy biological reasoning we get a better understanding of the
range and limits of mechanistic explanation and the character of other forms of causal explanation
in this area–such as pathway explanation–that have gone unnoticed. In fact, appreciating the role
of analogy in biology provides one fruitful way to understand the limits and range of a mechanistic
explanation. Since the inception of these new mechanist accounts, there have been widespread
worries about their over extension to fit various types of causal explanation (Woodward 2013;
Dupre´ 2013; Skillings 2015; Halina 2018). These worries have been motivated by the view that,
while mechanistic explanation is common and important, that is does not capture the whole of
explanatory practice in the biological sciences. This paper gives one way to understand the nature
and limits of mechanistic explanation, in a way that makes sense of biological reasoning, and
accommodates the intended use and meaning of those causal concepts that commonly figure in this
domain.
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